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GOD AND FREEDOM IN HUMAN EXPERIENCE. By the Right Rev. C. F. D'Arcy, D.D. London: Arnold, 1915. (The Donnellian Lectures for 1913-1914.) Pp. vi, 312.

It is perhaps hardly fair to regard this work from the point of view of strict philosophy; but it would be still less fair to regard it as merely the expression of a religious creed. The fact is that Dr. D'Arcy is primarily a theologian; and although he brings to the study of theological doctrines much genuine philosophical learning, of both past and present tendencies of thought, the conclusions he wishes to establish are theological conclusions, and he consequently employs metaphysical arguments only so far as they will help him to attain this end. The resulting eclecticism is exhibited chiefly in connection with Idealism and Bergson.

Dr. D'Arcy has long been known as an idealist of the school of Green. He is in this work most definitely a follower of Berkeley. Nevertheless, although he believes Berkeley to be one of the greatest of philosophers, he modifies somewhat his doctrines. He attempts also to give some idea of the nature of God, a problem which Berkeley left almost untouched. We are, however, told little about God's nature. He is identified with the philosophical absolute, perhaps somewhat arbitrarily, and his life is thus on a higher plane than ours. His experience constitutes the highest degree of reality, a way of being that we are not able to realize even imaginatively. It is somewhat odd to find the principles of Berkeley in conjunction with the notion of degrees of reality. Dr. D'Arcy, however, places them so, and uses the notion of degrees in an ingenious manner throughout. Thus, God is *perfect*, because the degrees of reality form a hierarchy in perfection, and God is the highest degree of reality. Again, God is *personal*, because the highest degree of reality we know is personal, and the higher degrees must contain all the perfection of the lower. Evil is somehow explained in God, and the mere fact that we do not know *how* is intelligible because we cannot conceive the highest degree of reality.

But although God is the Absolute, Pantheism is not true; and human beings are ultimately real (although *not* substances) and free. Freedom is defined as a quality of motived action, and here in particular much use is made of Bergson, although Dr. D'Arcy has apparently not realized that the logical conclusion of Berg-

son's treatment of Freedom is a determinism of the strictest sort. If we cannot understand how it is that God is omniscient and at the same time that we are free, we must have recourse to faith because theology demands the one and the moral life the other; and the conception of a higher degree of reality in which all such difficulties will be explained is at hand to help us. And all the ways of God to man are justified, if not to our understanding, at least to our faith. Dr. D'Arcy becomes almost dithyrambic over the value of pain, and its place in life; but his treatment is scarcely consistent, and makes us wonder if he has realized the force of Dr. Mc Taggart's analysis of the question. Dr. D'Arcy adds, as another demand of the moral life, that we are immortal.

Of all this one hardly knows what to say. The conclusions are those of Christian orthodoxy; but to imagine that they are borne out by any one of the philosophical theories used throughout the work to support this or that part of it, would be a fallacy. In spite of all the appearances to the contrary, it is not argument, but faith, which leads to the acceptance of these conclusions. An exception must be made in the case of the idealist argument which is generally employed to establish the spirituality of reality. Dr. D'Arcy uses this argument with strictness and consistency. He accepts its conclusion, however, somewhat too lightly, as though it were an eternal truth; and notwithstanding the broad philosophical culture revealed almost everywhere throughout the book, makes scarcely any reference to the large body of contemporary philosophical opinion which rejects it. In this connection it is perhaps pertinent to remark that Professor Alexander should not have been taken as typical of recent realists, since his theory of knowledge is a purely individual matter and is not held by any other important thinker of the modern realist school. And one would have liked to see in a review of recent philosophical theories a somewhat fuller statement of the position of Mr. Bertrand Russell than is given in the enigmatic note to page 74. It may be added that the statement (p. 18) that psychologists now universally agree that attention involves an act of will is incorrect. One of the primary classifications of attention by psychologists is into voluntary and *non-voluntary* (cf. Stout, *Groundwork*, p. 50). Such facts as these, however, do not alter the general character of the book, which, so far as correct and admirably clear expositions of various philosophical theories is concerned, leaves nothing to be desired.

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